

XIX.—*Ilicet*, *Scilicet*, *Videlicet*

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(I) If the first element in *ilicet*, *scilicet*, and *videlicet* is an infinitive, these compounds must have been formed very early; yet their original force as verbs clearly lingers in Plautus and, to a lesser degree, in Terence, though subsequently they became pure adverbs except to a few archaizers. (II) A study of Plautus' use of *licet* shows: (A) a generalizing infinitive, i.e. one lacking a specific agent, is used with *licet* very rarely, occurring in only 4 out of 99 instances (see note 77 for statistics); (B) an imperative is very often followed by *licet*. (III) A study of Plautus' and Terence's use of *ilicet* shows its frequent combination (A) with specific second person singular forms, (B) especially with imperatives; so to some extent *scilicet* and *videlicet* at least in Plautus. (IV) The common loss of verbal force in *i* and *vide* may have facilitated a similar loss in their combinations with *licet*; *scilicet* would have followed their pattern. (V) The striking similarity of *videlicet* and *calefacio* suggests a common origin; the only explanation accounting satisfactorily for both is that their first element is an imperative.

In last year's volume of the *TAPhA*<sup>1</sup> I endeavored to prove that the type *calefacio* represents a paratactic combination of a second person imperative and the verb *facio*, and I suggested there (324 note 116) that an excellent parallel is provided by the group *vide-*

<sup>1</sup> *TAPhA* 78.301-35 (1947). References to Hahn throughout the present paper are to that article. Other abbreviated forms of bibliographical reference are to be interpreted as follows: *ACISS* = *Atti del Congresso Internazionale di Scienze Storiche*; *ALS* = Andrews-Lewis-Short, *A New Latin Dictionary* (*Harpers' Latin Dictionary*); Brugmann, *Grund.* = Karl Brugmann and Berthold Delbrück, *Grundriss der vergleichenden Grammatik der indogermanischen Sprachen*<sup>2</sup>, 5 vols., Strassburg, 1897-1916; *EM* = A. Ernout and A. Meillet, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue latine*, Paris, 1932; Hofmann, *SS*: see *SS*; Hofmann, *Umgang.* = J. B. Hofmann, *Lateinische Umgangssprache*<sup>2</sup>, Heidelberg, 1936; *IF* = *Indogermanische Forschungen*; Kent = Roland G. Kent, *The Forms of Latin*, Baltimore, 1946; *KUB* = *Keilschrift-Urkunden aus Boghazköi*; *KZ* = *Zeitschrift für vergleichende Sprachforschung*; Leumann, *SS*: see *SS*; Lindsay = W. M. Lindsay, *The Latin Language*, Oxford, 1894; Lodge = Gonzalez Lodge, *Lexicon Plautinum*, 2 vols., Leipzig, 1904-33; *Mél. Thomas* = *Mélanges Paul Thomas*, Bruges, 1930; Müller = C. F. W. Müller, *Plautinische Prosodie*, Berlin, 1869; *SHAW* = *Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse*; Skutsch = Franz Skutsch, *Kleine Schriften*, Leipzig, 1914; Sommer, *Hdb.* = Ferdinand Sommer, *Handbuch der lateinischen Laut- und Formenlehre*<sup>2</sup>, Heidelberg, 1914; Sommer, *Krit. Erl.* = Ferdinand Sommer, *Kritische Erläuterungen zur lateinischen Laut- und Formenlehre*, Heidelberg, 1914; *SRPC* = *Scaenicae Romanorum Poesis Fragmenta, Comiorum Fragmenta*<sup>3</sup>, ed. by Otto Ribbeck, Leipzig, 1898; *SS* = Manu Leumann and Joh. Bapt. Hofmann, *Stolz-Schmalz Lateinische Grammatik*<sup>4</sup>, Munich, 1928; Stolz, *Hist. Gram.* = Fr. Stolz, *Historische Grammatik der lateinischen Sprache*, vol. 1, Leipzig, 1894; Stolz, *SS*<sup>4</sup> = Friedrich Stolz and J. H. Schmalz, *Latei-*

*licet*, *scilicet*, and *ilicet*, if the first element in these verbs is an imperative, as some scholars hold.<sup>2</sup> I think I can adduce some arguments tending to support this belief.

## I

In classical Latin the three words in question seem to be adverbs pure and simple, and they have acquired adverbial usage as early as Plautus. In this author *ilicet*<sup>3</sup> is used in the sense of "go on, it's no use" in *Cur.* 186 and *Ep.* 685, and in the sense of "woe is me, it's all over with me" in *Am.* 338, *Cis.* 685, and *St.* 394. The fundamental meaning of *scilicet*<sup>4</sup> is "certainly";<sup>5</sup> it is used, like our collo-

*nische Grammatik*<sup>6</sup>, Munich, 1910; Sturtevant, *Chr.* = Edgar H. Sturtevant and George Bechtel, *A Hittite Chrestomathy*, Philadelphia, 1935; *WH* = A. Walde, *Lateinisches etymologisches Wörterbuch*<sup>7</sup>, revised by J. B. Hofmann, Heidelberg, 1938-; *ZOG* = *Zeitschrift für die österreichischen Gymnasien*. (N.B. This list does not include abbreviations listed on p. vi of this volume, or self-evident items such as familiar editions and translations which need no additional identification.) Citations from Plautus or Terence do not usually bear the author's name; they follow the line-numbers and (unless there is a reason for change) the readings of the Oxford Texts, edited by Lindsay and Tyrrell respectively. Quotations illustrating *ilicet*, *scilicet*, and *videlicet* are cited in full; those illustrating *licet*, in the interest of brevity, give only enough words to make clear the sense and the syntax, with no indication of omissions, and usually bear only the number of the line which actually contains the word *licet*. A dash separating parts of a quotation denotes a change of speaker.

<sup>2</sup> I believe one of the first to oppose this explanation was Deecke, in a work that I have unfortunately been unable to obtain: *Facere und fieri in ihrer Komposition* (Strassburg, 1875) 35. But none the less it seems to have been generally accepted till 1896, when Skutsch published in *Satura Viadrina* 134-5 (= *Kl. Schr.* 104) his view that the first element in the three words is an infinitive; this he reaffirmed in 1903, in *ACISS* 192 note 1 (= *Kl. Schr.* 284 note 1). Since then scholars have followed him almost uniformly; see Güntert, *SHAW* 8.8.24 note 2 (1917); Leumann, *SS* 328, and Hofmann, *ib.* 587 (1928); Ernout, *Mél. Thomas* 232 (1930); *EM* s.v. *ilicet* (1932); *WH* s.v. *ilicet* (1938). I know of only one expression in recent times of a dissenting view, that of Kent 130 (1946); he states there that the prior element in the words in question was an imperative rather than an infinitive, and in a letter to me under date of Dec. 9, 1947, he says in answer to a question from me as to his reasons, "I adopted imperative rather than infinitive because it seemed to me more in accord with the colloquial style of Plautus." The element in question is usually equated with an infinitive by ancient grammarians: cf. Servius (Daniel) on *Aen.* 2.424: *ilicet*, hoc est *ire licet*; and on 6.216: *ilicet*, quod *ire licet* significat; Donatus on *Phor.* 208: *ilicet*, quod significat *ire licet*; and on *Ad.* 450: ut *videlicet videre licet*, sic et *scilicet scire licet* et *ilicet ire licet*. These comments (like that of Celsus *apud* Charisius, *GLK* 1.200, on *ilicet*: antiqui pro *eas licet*) may refer to meaning alone, not derivation; and in any case the testimony of Romans, early or late, about the etymology of their language is of little or no value.

<sup>3</sup> For the reading *ilicet* in *Truc.* 896, noted by Lodge s.v., there seems to be no basis.

<sup>4</sup> Also cited in *Men.* 12 and 1109, but the reading is corrupt.

<sup>5</sup> The distinction made in *ALS*, that *scilicet* gives a false, *videlicet* a true, explanation, certainly does not hold in comedy. Nor is the ironical nuance that becomes so

quial *sure*, in answer to a question, in *Ps.* 1178 and *Rud.* 949, and to a command,<sup>6</sup> in *Poen.* 600<sup>7</sup> and *Trin.* 579; as an indication of agreement with a statement, in *As.* 490 (here ironically<sup>8</sup>) and *Poen.* 735;<sup>9</sup> in the sense of "why, to be sure" in *Men.* 392;<sup>10</sup> and as an emphatic "to be sure" in *Cap.* 283, *Ps.* 879, and *Rud.* 1098.<sup>11</sup> The meaning of *videlicet*<sup>12</sup> is "evidently, obviously," as in *Cap.* 286, *Mil.* 1283, and *Mos.* 980.

But, even though in many passages all three words are clearly revealed as adverbs, just as clearly in a number of others they still serve as finite verbs composed of *licet* preceded by a verbal element that stands in either paratactic or hypotactic relation with it. Thus *ilicet* takes modifying words that apply to *eo* in *Cap.* 90:

vel extra portam Trigeminam ad saccum ilicet,<sup>13</sup>

and in *Cap.* 469:

ilicet parasiticae arti maxumum malam crucem;<sup>14</sup>

the idea of going is certainly present in *Mos.* 848:

ergo intro eo igitur sine perductore. — ilicet,

and both Lodge (s.v. *ilicet*) and Ernout (*Mél. Thomas* 231–2) compare with it *Truc.* 592<sup>15</sup> as another example of the use of *ilicet* in its proper sense.<sup>16</sup> And *scilicet* and *videlicet* both govern indirect discourse just as would *scio* and *video*, in the following:

*As.* 787: ita scilicet facturam;

*Cur.* 263: item alios deos facturos scilicet;

common later in the case of both words usually present, though it may be in *scilicet* in *An.* 185, and surely is in *scilicet* in *As.* 490 and *Phor.* 695 and in *videlicet* in *As.* 599.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. below, note 111.

<sup>7</sup> On the use of *scilicet et* in this passage, see note 37.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. note 5.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. the parallel use of the adverb *quippini* six times in the same passage.

<sup>10</sup> Lodge classes this passage with the foregoing ones as a "particula confirmativa in responsis," but it is not quite the same.

<sup>11</sup> Possibly also in *Am.* 1125; but there the right reading is probably *si licet*.

<sup>12</sup> The reading *videlicet* also occurs in *Truc.* 884, but this is certainly false.

<sup>13</sup> This reading is Bothe's emendation of: vel ire extra portam Trigeminam ad saccum licet; see note 58.

<sup>14</sup> Here again, as in 90, a reading *licet* is found, but is usually rejected as a corruption.

<sup>15</sup> It seems quite different to me, however (cf. note 29 below). I shall return to both these examples later; see 330 f.

<sup>16</sup> Lodge also lists here *Truc.* 896, which, however, I have already dismissed (note 3) as corrupt.

*Ps.* 1179: *scilicet* solitum esse;

*Rud.* 395: nunc eam cum navi *scilicet* abiisse pessum in altum;

*As.* 598-9: nunc enim esse

negotiosum interdus *videlicet* Solonem;<sup>17</sup>

*St.* 555: *videlicet* parcum fuisse illum senem;

and 557: *videlicet* non fuisse illum aequom adulescentem.

The transition from verb to adverb is excellently shown in *Ps.* 1177-9, where *scilicet* the verb (with indirect discourse) is used in an answer to the second question precisely as is *scilicet* the adverb (used absolutely) to the first.

I am not for the moment raising the question whether the first element was originally an imperative or an infinitive; in *Cap.* 469 it certainly seems as if Plautus thought it was the latter, though below I shall point out other features of his usage that point in the opposite direction. But any views on historical linguistics that Plautus may have entertained are of course irrelevant and immaterial. The point that I am making just now is merely that the composition cannot have been of very early date, since the two elements at least to some extent retain their original force in Plautus. On the other hand if we are to assume that the three forms under discussion are syncopated developments of *ire licet*, *scire licet*, and *videre licet*, their formation was surely early, presumably at the time when the word-stress was still on the initial syllable; and in that case one would expect any independent force of their component parts to have faded entirely from view.<sup>18</sup>

Conditions seem to have remained unchanged at least until the time of Terence, for he too employs the words both as adverbs and as verbs. *Videlicet*, which he uses only three times, in *HT* 263, 514, *Ad.* 450, is for him always an adverb meaning "obviously." On the other hand *ilicet*, which he uses five times, seems to be for him always an independent verb, asyndetically coordinated with other verbs; examples are *HT* 974, *Eun.* 54 and 347, *Phor.* 208, and *Ad.* 791 (all these I discuss further below). Finally *scilicet*,

<sup>17</sup> This reading, which is generally accepted by the editors, is that of Müller 279-80.

<sup>18</sup> No Roman writer shows the slightest suggestion of analyzing genuinely ancient compounds such as the imperfect and future in *-bam* and *-bo*. Thus even if Hoffmann is right in his explanation of the imperfect as consisting of an old infinitive (in *-se* or *-si*) plus the verb *\*bhvam* (*RhM* 73.227-8), he is surely wrong, I think, in assuming a parallel development for *ilicet* (*ib.* 230) and *calefacio* (*ib.* 230-1), both admittedly later (cf. on their relative age *ib.* 230, and 231 note 2, respectively). On the necessity of separating the latter from the imperfect, see Hahn 321-3.

common in Terence, is generally an adverb.<sup>19</sup> Its usual meaning is, as in Plautus, "certainly, undoubtedly, of course," either in an answer (to a question, in *An.* 950, *Eun.* 401 and 1040, *Phor.* 792,<sup>20</sup> or to a statement, in *Ad.* 729 and 751, *Hec.* 467<sup>21</sup>), or by way of emphasis (in *An.* 175, *HT* 312, 647, 705, *Eun.* 185, 676, *Phor.* 132, *Hec.* 669, *Ad.* 811, 839, 874); in *Phor.* 695-6:

quom argentum repetent, nostra causa scilicet  
in nervom potius ibit

(and possibly in *An.* 185:

id populus curat scilicet),

it appears to have the ironical flavor that in a later period is so frequently associated with both *scilicet* and *videlicet*.<sup>22</sup> Occasionally, as in *HT* 705:

et scilicet iam me hoc voles patrem exorare

and *Eun.* 346:

comites secuti scilicet sunt virginem?,

it seems to have the meaning "obviously, naturally," that strictly belongs to *videlicet*.<sup>23</sup> Whereas Plautus regularly places it either before or after a clause, as if in realization of its original existence as a separate verb,<sup>24</sup> Terence shows how completely adverbial it has become by often interpolating it into the heart of a clause, as in *HT* 792-3:

neque tu scilicet  
illuc confugies,

<sup>19</sup> It is made parallel with *probe* in *Ad.* 751, and with *vero* in *Eun.* 401. Cf. note 9.

<sup>20</sup> The use of *scilicet* here is regularly, and perhaps quite rightly, explained as not quite logical; it seems a reply to the general sense of the preceding question, *quid haec videntur?*, but not to the precise words (cf. Hofmann, *Umgang.* 18). However, if we interpret it as having its full verbal force, the lack of logic disappears; see below, 313.

<sup>21</sup> This passage is a little different from the others; *scilicet* here is probably a confirmation of a preceding statement rather than an expression of agreement with it.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. note 5.

<sup>23</sup> Confusion of *scilicet* and *videlicet*, which so closely approach each other in meaning and construction, is much more readily understood than confusion of *ilicet* and *scilicet* (cf. note 111), where only the rhyme seems a factor.

<sup>24</sup> However, Plautus does insert it in the middle of a clause in indirect discourse in *As.* 787 and *Rud.* 395; cf. the similar position of *videlicet* in *As.* 599.

*Eun.* 346 and *Phor.* 695–6 (both quoted just above), and *Ad.* 811–2:

et me tum uxorem credidisti scilicet  
ducturum.

Yet for Terence too *scilicet* still remains capable of governing indirect discourse, as in

*HT* 358–9: *scilicet*  
facturum me esse,  
856–7: *scilicet*  
datum iri,  
892: continuo iniecisce verba tibi Dromonem *scilicet*.

Elsewhere, though seemingly employed as an adverb, it is none the less used in a parallel way to the verb *scio* just above (in *Ad.* 729) and *certo scio* just below (in *Phor.* 792).<sup>25</sup> And in *Phor.* 792, Demipho's reply *scilicet* to Nausistrata's *quid haec videntur?* becomes quite logical<sup>26</sup> if we give it its full verbal force — "you may know" — i.e. "you can easily guess."

By the beginning of the classical period we have a wholly different state of affairs. Seemingly *ilicet*<sup>27</sup> has disappeared altogether from the living language; Vergil's eventual artificial revival of it, probably *metri causa*, in the sense of *ilico*,<sup>28</sup> with which apparently it had no connection either in derivation or in meaning,<sup>29</sup> suggests that in his day it was obsolete and no longer understood. There were a few imitations of his use of it by other employers of the dactylic hexameter, including Grattius, Valerius Flaccus, Silius

<sup>25</sup> Contrast note 19.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. note 20.

<sup>27</sup> On the history of this word see Lindsay 564; Wackernagel, *KZ* 33.54; Hey, *ALL* 13.210; *TLL* s.v.; Ernout, *REL* 7.141 and *Mél. Thomas* 229–37.

<sup>28</sup> *Aen.* 2.424, 758; 7.583; 8.223; 11.468. Wackernagel, *KZ* 33.54, assigns a similar use to Tibullus 2.6.15 (sic! the correct reference is 2.6.16), but this is highly doubtful. In the passage in question we find the readings *ilicet* (in one codex), *scilicet*, and *si licet*, of which the last is generally accepted by the editors — I think with justice.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Hey, *ALL* 13.210, and Ernout, *Mél. Thomas* 229. In *ALS*, however, the meaning "straightway, immediately" is said to be derived from the original meaning "let us go, let us be gone" (through the intermediate idea of hastening), and is recognized as existing in pre-classical times as well as in the Augustan poets. The one example there given is Afranius 215 *SRPC*: ah tu eloquens <es>: *ilicet*, in which Charisius *GLK* 1.200–1 (who cites the passage as: an tu eloquens *ilicet*?) explains *ilicet* as used in the sense of *subito* or *extemplo*; it seems to me far more the former ("all of a sudden") than the latter, and in any case the passage is too fragmentary to be of much use as a guide to meaning. I would rather cite *Truc.* 592, where according

Italicus, and Statius. And then it fades out of the picture again<sup>30</sup> until, centuries later, it is once more wrongly revived, in three distinct senses: (1) again as a metrically convenient synonym for *ilico*, in Claudian, Paulinus of Nola, and Sidonius Apollinaris (so, too, later in prose, in Gregory of Tours); (2) as a synonym for *igitur* in Sidonius Apollinaris (also found again in Gregory of Tours); and (3), most interestingly, perhaps as a synonym for *scilicet*, once more in Sidonius Apollinaris, *Ep.* 1.9.8.<sup>31</sup>

On the other hand, *scilicet* and *videlicet* remain in constant current use as adverbs; but as verbs they too ceased to exist, at least so far as the standard literary language bears witness. The use may perhaps have survived as a quasi-colloquialism, since we find three possible — though by no means certain — examples in Cicero's letters, *ad Att.* 5.11.7 and 13.5.1, and *ad Quint.* 2.6.2.<sup>32</sup> And it was assuredly revived as an archaism by writers who tended to archaize, both in the classic age and later; Hofmann (*SS* 587)

to *ALS ilicet* means "let us go, let us be gone," as it is there said to do also in *Cap.* 469, *HT* 974, and *Phor.* 208, all of which seem to me utterly different (in the last one *ilicet*, though I take it otherwise, might mean "let us go," but not in either of the others). The treatment in *TLL*, as might be expected, is far better. Here the meaning "immediately" is not recognized before Vergil; the Afranius passage is dismissed as of doubtful interpretation. Very properly, *HT* 974 and *Phor.* 208 are separated from *Cap.* 469; however, the difficult passage *Truc.* 592 is classed with it (though doubtfully) as an example of *ire licet* not yet coalesced, which I do not think it is. (As a matter of fact, if *ilicet* here is not confused with *ilico*, I think it is confused with *scilicet* or simple *licet*; I shall return to this problem later; see 330 f.)

<sup>30</sup> To be sure, the usage is still familiar to Arruntius Celsus in the second century A.D., since, according to Charisius (*GLK* 1.200), he writes on *Aen.* 11 <468> (as already quoted in part above in note 2): nunc pro *ilico*, id est *statim*; antiqui pro *eas licet*. But, since to him the *antiqui* are those earlier than Vergil, his *nunc* may refer primarily to the period of Vergil (and the latter's imitators of the first century A.D.).

<sup>31</sup> Cf. note 111. However, the reading, which is Luetjohn's, is far from certain: the *TLL* may well be right in preferring Mohr's lection, *scilicet* itself. Also, even if *ilicet* is correct, it might be used, as so often elsewhere in Sidonius, in the sense of "therefore," repeating and reinforcing the *igitur* with which the sentence begins. But certainly later *ilicet* seems to have become a synonym for *scilicet*, according to Paulus Diaconus' definition of it as *sine dubio*.

<sup>32</sup> Hofmann (*SS* 587) expresses doubt about the first, which is the only one he refers to. The two passages *ad Att.* are usually emended (Ernesti changed *datas* in the first to *datae sunt*, and Wesenberg inserted *erravi* in the second), but Purser accepts both in the Oxford Text, citing each as a defense for the other. All three examples are defended by Tyrrell (1<sup>a</sup>.81 and *ad loc.*) in the Tyrrell-Purser edition, where, however, his collaborator Purser expresses doubt in regard to the passage *ad Quint.*, insisting (rightly, I think) that here *scilicet* is not "anything more than the ordinary 'of course'."

lists Varro, Sallust,<sup>33</sup> and Lucretius for the former period, and Fronto, Gellius,<sup>34</sup> and Apuleius for the latter.

Lucretius' usage is particularly interesting. It is clear that he thought of the first element in our words as an infinitive. Thus while he employs *videlicet* once<sup>35</sup> and *scilicet* many times<sup>36</sup> as adverbs, he also employs them as verbs in 1.210:

esse videlicet in terris primordia rerum

and 2.469:

scilicet esse globosa tamen,<sup>37</sup>

and elsewhere he employs *videre licet* and *scire licet* in precisely the same way, as in 2.871:

quippe videre licet vivos exsistere vermis<sup>38</sup>

and 1.894:

scire licet non esse in rebus res ita mixtas.<sup>39</sup>

But for the adverb *scilicet* as in, e.g., 4.773:

scilicet id fieri celeri ratione putandumst,

he also substitutes *scire licet* in 2.809:

scire licet sine eo fieri non posse putandum est.

<sup>33</sup> The four instances cited from Sallust are *Jug.* 4.6, 102.9, 113.3, *Orat. Phil.* 5. I think that in the first and third the indirect discourse may depend not on *scilicet* but on a word in the preceding sentence (*dicere* and *dicitur* respectively). In the second some editors read *placuit* rather than *placuisse*. But the fourth seems certain, and this may justify the others.

<sup>34</sup> A very clear example is Gellius 17.5.9.

<sup>35</sup> In 1.835.

<sup>36</sup> There are 26 clear instances: 1.377, 439, 667; 2.132, 710, 922; 3.563, 641, 765, 840, 1068; 4.254, 532, 773, 792, 893; 5.405, 875; 6.135, 185, 732, 788, 837, 846, 995, 1040.

<sup>37</sup> He also has a special use of *scilicet* et "yes, and," "quite true, and," in which *scilicet* approximates a verb since it is coordinated with a clause. He has quoted a supposed counter-argument from an adversary beginning with *et*; this he temporarily grants, and may even add a seemingly reinforcing argument of his own, but in the end he always gives a conclusion that proves his own view right after all. Recognized examples are 1.809, 1.901, and 6.674; and to these I would add 4.848, enclosing 843-7 in quotation-marks. (There is something a little like this in *Poen.* 600, where, however, the clause introduced by *et* is coordinate with the dependent clause in the preceding speech.) We may also compare 1.888 and 4.1126 (however, 2.976 is different; there I think *scilicet* is ironical, and *et* is correlative with *et* in 977).

<sup>38</sup> Other Lucretian examples are 4.698, 5.899, 6.79, 6.781; and, in the order *licet* . . . *videre*, 4.184 and 6.912. Cf. too Varro's use in *RR* of *videre licet* (1.14.3; 2.10.7), *licet videre* (1.6.2, 9.6, 55.7; 2.10.1), and *licet* . . . *videre* (1.7.3).

<sup>39</sup> There are 14 other instances in Lucretius, all with indirect discourse: 1.679, 860; 2.743, 797, 815, 838, 930, 967; 3.229, 866, 873; 4.754; 5.245, 590.



This is a use wholly foreign to the early writers, so far as I know; Plautus combines *scire* with *licet* (*Mer.* 152, *Ps.* 16), and also *videre* (*Mil.* 70<sup>40</sup>) and *ire* (*Am.* 617, *Cap.* 90,<sup>41</sup> 451, *Men.* 368, *Mos.* 852, *Ps.* 1182<sup>42</sup>), precisely like any other infinitive, with no indication that he views such a combination as a special stereotyped periphrasis, and he *never* treats a phrase of this sort as frozen into an adverb. This use clearly disqualifies Lucretius as having anything whatsoever to contribute in regard to the genesis of the construction, which he obviously used as an alien and artificial locution without understanding it any better than Vergil did *ilicet*.

## II

Even Plautus, of course, cannot give us definitive aid in a matter of origins. But it may be helpful to observe the constructions that he uses in clauses depending upon *licet*.<sup>43</sup> There are no

<sup>40</sup> There is no more significance in *videre* . . . *liceat* here than in *videas licet* in *Trin.* 1179.

<sup>41</sup> See notes 13 and 58.

<sup>42</sup> Here Studemund alters *ire licebit* to *ilicebit*; but nowhere does Plautus use any form other than *licet* as the second element of our three compounds, and I think Ernout is right in pronouncing this conjecture "purement imaginaire" (*Mél. Thomas* 231). Cf. below, note 131.

<sup>43</sup> I am excluding some passages where *licet* has been read but in my opinion unquestionably should not be, namely, *Bac.* 126, *Cas.* 851, *Mer.* 441, *Mil.* 708, *Poen.* 285, *Truc.* 212; likewise the hopelessly fragmentary *Vid.* 19. I also exclude as undoubtedly non-Plautine one example from an Argument, *Mil. Arg.* 1.7 (cf. note 50); but I include examples from prologues, since in regard to these I hesitate to draw the line between what is and what is not genuine. And I am of course disregarding the elliptical examples where there is present no verb depending directly on *licet*, the general sense being supplied by another clause, as in *Rud.* 854: *opta dum licet*, i.e. *opta dum (tibi) licet (optare)*, or even by the general context, as in *Cis.* 533: *aequa lege pauperi cum divite non licet*, *Mil.* 501: *licetne?* (i.e. "may I say something?"), *Ps.* 428: *si meo arbitratu liceat*, *omnes pendeant*. There are 34 of these, namely (in addition to the 4 just cited): *As.* 12, 152, 308, 603, perhaps *Bac.* 488 (the reading is uncertain), *Cap.* 464, *Cas.* 457 (the second *licet*), *Cur.* 170, 621 (the second *licet*), 623, *Men.* 599, 878, *Mer.* 724, *Mil.* 521, 1263, 1329 (the second *licet*), *Mos.* 20, probably 323 (if we punctuate *si tibi cordi est facere, licet*; on this passage see further below, notes 61 and 90), *Per.* 372, 374, 848, *Poen.* 52, *Rud.* 724, 803 (the second *licet*), *St.* 564, *Trin.* 465, 566 (*bis*), 1032, *Truc.* 630. (In *Per.* 377, where some read *si liceat mihi*, evidently with some sort of ellipsis, I think the sense would rather demand *si liceat per me*, and so I prefer the variant reading *si lubeat mihi*.) In other instances we have a neuter pronoun with *licet*, whose exact construction is hard to explain: *id* in *Bac.* 344 and *Rud.* 680a seems like the subject of *licet* if such is possible, but since we also find the plural *haec* in *St.* 448, and *omnia* in *Rud.* 1216 and 1222, we probably must take it as object of *facere* to be supplied, or, perhaps better, as a sort of inner object with *licet*. Perhaps *quod* in *Poen.* 440 is similar, but more likely the sentence is interrupted, since it is part of a highly disjointed speech.

examples with the imperative; only 7 with the subjunctive,<sup>44</sup> which is often used interchangeably with the imperative;<sup>45</sup> and the large number of 99 with the infinitive. At first sight, this might seem to point definitely toward the infinitive rather than the imperative as providing the first element in our three words. But a closer examination of Plautine usage reveals evidence tending just as definitely in the other direction.

The disadvantage inherent in the use of an infinitive as opposed to a finite form such as the imperative or the subjunctive is its inability to convey any indication as to the person performing the action that it predicates. Such indication can be provided (1) by the subject of a main verb (such as *possum* or *statuo*) with which the infinitive is in complementary relation, (2) by a dative of reference used with an impersonal main verb (such as *licet* or *lubet*) of which the infinitive is subject, (3) by the subject of the infinitive. In the case of *licet*, obviously the first method is ruled out, but both the second and third occur.

The use of the accusative is relatively rare in Plautus. I can cite only ten cases.<sup>46</sup> Of these four need no special comment: *Cas.* 706: *redire me ut liceat*, *Ps.* 16: *licet me id scire*, *Truc.* 747: *licet me participem fieri*, *Frag.* 121: *licet vos abire*. With these belongs *Mos.* 53: *licet med amare et te bubulcitarier*, if *licet* is correctly read, but the preferred lection is *decet*. In *Trin.* 21: *Plautus rogat ut liceat possidere hanc nomen fabulam*, where the accusative subject is a thing, a dative of reference would be less natural, since the permission requested is to be granted to the author rather than to the work. In *Per.* 774: *te licet liberam med amplecti*, the use of the accusative rather than the dative is somewhat surprising, since it results in ambiguity<sup>47</sup> (hardly serious, to be sure, since it matters little which of the pair involved is the actor and which the recipient of the action). On the other hand, in *As.* 421: *quoi numquam unam rem me licet semel praecipere furi*, and in *Per.* 290: *liceat servom tibi male dicere*, the use of the accusative rather than the dative obviates ambiguity, since each contains a dative of a

<sup>44</sup> *As.* 718, *Cap.* 303, *Ep.* 471, *Mer.* 989, *Mos.* 713, *Rud.* 139, *Trin.* 1179. In Terence I know of a single example, *Phor.* 347.

<sup>45</sup> Cf. Hahn 324-5.

<sup>46</sup> Possibly *Mil.* 1039 might be added to these; see note 73.

<sup>47</sup> Contrast *Am.* 465: *patri ut liceret tuto illam amplexarier*.

different sort.<sup>48</sup> Finally, *Cas.* 89: non mihi licere meam rem me solum, ut volo, loqui atque cogitare sine ted arbitro, seems peculiar because it appears to involve, with colloquial redundancy, the combination of a dative and an accusative, and Lodge (s.v.) and Hofmann (*SS* 583) so characterize it; but in my opinion *me solum* "all by myself" should rather be looked upon as used in the predicate, in which case the passage simply belongs with the numerous ones exemplifying merely the use of the dative with *licet*.<sup>49</sup>

Of these there are 35,<sup>50</sup> justifying us in viewing this as the normal Plautine construction. As typical examples may be cited *Mil.* 500: quidvis licere facere vobis, *Poen.* 412: tibi vendere aedis licet, *Rud.* 245: mihi te licet tangere. The others are: *Am.* 157, 393, 465, 594, 986, 1125;<sup>51</sup> *As.* 916; *Aul.* 319, 751; *Cap.* 451, 512; *Cas.* 410; *Ep.* 177, 324, 338; *Mer.* 152; *Mil.* 680, 1404; *Mos.* 598, 753, 800; *Per.* 376, 601, 799; *Ps.* 1182;<sup>52</sup> *Rud.* 551, 723, 803, 1117; *St.* 611; *Truc.* 736; *Frag.* 6.

Where no dative or accusative appears, the doer of the action denoted by the infinitive is almost always made very clear by the context. There are 39 such cases. Sometimes the infinitive is in close proximity to another verb which has the same agent. This is particularly common when the *licet* clause depends on a verb of asking,<sup>53</sup> as in *Rud.* 834: quaeso abire ut liceat; *Mil.* 1329: obsecro licet complecti priu' quam proficisco; *Am.* 388: obsecro ut liceat te adloqui, ut ne vapulem; *Poen.* 1343: obsecro te suspendere ut me liceat; 1362: obsecro te ut liceat simplum solvere; *Mil.* 70: orant, ambiunt, exobsecrant videre ut liceat. It may also be noted that

<sup>48</sup> Of course at times no ambiguity results from the presence of two datives: for instance, no one could mistake the meaning of *Am.* 986-7: qui minus liceat deo minitarius populo quam servolo?

<sup>49</sup> Cf. the not wholly dissimilar use of an accusative predicate adjective with *licet* and the dative, e.g. Caesar, *BG* 6.35.8: quibus licet iam esse fortunatissimos. However, it may be an argument against this that in such cases Plautus uses only the dative, as *Ep.* 338: quieto tibi licet esse, *St.* 611: tibi incenato esse licet, *Truc.* 301: abire si volunt salvis licet (cf. *Men.* 878: quid cesso abire dum salvo licet?), *Rud.* 621: lege potius liceat quam vi victo vivere.

<sup>50</sup> Or 36 if we include *Cas.* 89, treated just above. (I am excluding as undoubtedly non-Plautine one additional example of the same sort, *Mil.* Arg. 1.7; cf. note 43, second sentence.)

<sup>51</sup> I accept the reading *si licet* here; cf. note 11.

<sup>52</sup> On this see note 42.

<sup>53</sup> Of course even in such cases a dative is sometimes present, as in *Aul.* 319: infinit postulare ut sibi liceret milvum vadarius, *Cap.* 512: orat obsecratque eum sibi ut liceat videre, *Mos.* 753: te hoc orare iussit ut sibi liceret inspicere aedis.

in two of the above, *Mil.* 1329 and *Am.* 388, the main verb is reinforced by a subsequent dependent verb.<sup>54</sup>

Other examples for which the agent is supplied by the main verb, with or without an expressed subject accompanying it, are: *Cas.* 809: *perii ego!* dirrumpi licet; *Mos.* 852: *age*; ire intro audacter licet; *Bac.* 339: *sapienter fecit filius*, quom diviti homini id aurum servandum dedit; ab eo licebit quamvis subito sumere; *Ep.* 722: *me meruisse* intellego ut liceat facere; *Mil.* 840: quoniam aemulari non licet, nunc *invides*; *Per.* 369: malo cavere meliust *te*. — at si non licet cavere, quid *agam*? At times the verb is part of the utterance of a different person, as *Am.* 617: *vidistin* uxorem meam? — quin intro ire numquam licitum est. — quis *te* prohibuit?; *Cur.* 401: quaeso ne me *incomities*. — licetne inforare, si incomitiare non licet? In two instances while the person addressed is to perform the action, the speaker will participate therein also: *Men.* 368: omne paratumst, ut *iussisti* atque ut *voluisti*, neque *tibi* ulla morast intus. prandium, ut *iussisti*, hic curatumst; ubi lubet, ire licet accubitum; *Mer.* 802: *iubeas*, si *sapias*, haec intro auferrier; eadem licebit mox cenare.

Elsewhere it is a dependent verb that supplies the agent, as in: *Mer.* 150: opera licet experiri, *qui* me *rupi* caussa currendo tua;<sup>55</sup> *Rud.* 1241: *ille qui cavet*, uti bene licet partum bene; *Men.* 589: *me* cliens habuit neque quod *volui* agere aut quicum licitumst, ita *med* attinit; *Cas.* 872: licet quae *velis* proloqui;<sup>56</sup> *Mos.* 239: si quid *tu* voles loqui, id loqui licebit; *Truc.* 301: ubi res *perdidere*, abire hinc si *volunt* salvis licet; *Aul.* 381: festo die si quid *prodegeris*, profesto egere liceat, nisi *peperceris*;<sup>57</sup> *Cap.* 90: nisi *qui* colaphos perpeti *potes parasitus*, vel ire extra portam Trigeminam ad saccum licet;<sup>58</sup> *As.* 935: licet manere dum *cenem*; *Mil.* 1329: obsecro licet complecti

<sup>54</sup> See below, note 59.

<sup>55</sup> The reading *quam* exists, which it is tempting to change to *quom*; but if we keep *qui*, it seems to me that this has to supply the agent of *experiri*, unless we are to assume a complete anacoluthon. It must be admitted that this passage is not so clear as most. Nixon (Loeb Library translation) renders, "you can test that by experience," and similarly Naudet, "tu peux t'en assurer par expérience"; Clonard keeps this exactly, but Ernout (Budé edition) changes to "je peux t'en rendre compte par expérience," which I think is right.

<sup>56</sup> Contrast *Per.* 601: *roga* ut tibi percontari liceat quae velis.

<sup>57</sup> However, perhaps the agent is wholly unspecified and general. Cf. the seventh paragraph below, 323.

<sup>58</sup> This passage has already been cited above as an example of *illicet* (cf. note 13); but the MS reading is *licet*, and emendation may not be necessary (see Skutsch 97 note 1 and 104). On the reading *potes*, see below, note 105.

priu' quam *proficisco*,<sup>59</sup> *Am.* 388: obsecro ut liceat te adloqui, ut ne *vapulem*.<sup>60</sup>

In four of the examples already cited, *Per.* 369, *Am.* 617, *Men.* 368 and 589, a personal pronoun reinforces the verb in making clear the agent of the infinitive. We also find personal pronouns in *Ps.* 643: febrim *tibi* esse, quia non licet hoc inicere ungulas; *Mos.* 323: si *tibi* cordi est, facere licet;<sup>61</sup> *Vid.* 43: si *tibi* pudico homine est opus, me licet conducere; perhaps *Per.* 377: lubere *tibi* licere intellego; verum lubere hau liceat;<sup>62</sup> *Cap.* 369: utroque vorseum recutumst ingenium meum, ad *ted* atque *illum*; pro rota me uti licet; and *Cis.* 227: pater detinuit *me*, neque licitum interea est *meam* amicam visere, where a possessive pronominal adjective appears as well. An emphatic doubling of such adjectives occurs in *Am.* 452: nonne erae *meae* nuntiare quod erus *meu'* iussit licet? Pronominal adverbs clarify the general situation in *Cas.* 196: *hic* nunc licet dicere (further reinforced by the following *nos sumus*) and 794: dicere *hic* quidvis licet<sup>63</sup> (also met *Per.* 711, *Poen.* 437,<sup>64</sup> and *Truc.* 884); and in *Cas.* 957: nugas *istic* dicere licet?<sup>65</sup>

Finally, in one case a dependent noun (a genitive) designates the agent of the infinitive. This is *As.* 225: si papillam pertractavit, haud est ab red *aucupis*; savium si sumpsit, sumere eum licet.<sup>66</sup>

Instances where the context does not make quite clear who performs the action are far fewer (15 in all) and seem to fall into a few definite categories. Perhaps there is a sort of humility, real or feigned, in the omission of the subject (the person asking or

<sup>59</sup> Here and in the following example, *Am.* 388, the dependent verb reinforces a principal verb of asking, so that these passages are listed in two categories.

<sup>60</sup> See note 59.

<sup>61</sup> This punctuation makes *facere* depend directly on *licet*. With different punctuation, two other interpretations are possible: see above, note 43, and below, note 90.

<sup>62</sup> The reading *lubere hau lubeat* also exists, but I prefer *liceat* to *lubeat* in the first part of line 377, although I prefer *lubeat* to *liceat* in the second (already discussed above, note 43).

<sup>63</sup> Contrast two passages where we have a dative instead of *hic*: *Am.* 393 (cited again below in note 68): nunc licet mi quidvis loqui, and *Frag.* 6: nunc mihi licet quidvis loqui.

<sup>64</sup> In this passage the language is purposely made vague and disjointed. Cf. 440 just below, and what was said of it at the end of note 43.

<sup>65</sup> There is a reading *isti* also, which leads Lodge to class this passage with *Cas.* 410 as exemplifying the use of the dative; but he also records the reading *istic* and recognizes it as an adverb, which I am sure it is.

<sup>66</sup> Lodge classes this passage with those in which the infinitive is combined with a subject-accusative; but *eum* is surely the object, not the subject, of *sumere*.

claiming permission to speak)<sup>67</sup> in *Ps.* 252: non licet conloqui te? (said by a slave) and in *Rud.* 1227: quam mox licet te compellare? (said by a fisherman, likewise a slave),<sup>68</sup> we may recall the same omission in two passages (*Am.* 388 and 452) uttered by a slave already noted among examples where the subject is more easily supplied by the context, also we may compare the not dissimilar words of a timorous hen-pecked old man about his justly suspicious wife, *Cas.* 275: Hercules dique istam perdant, quod nunc liceat dicere. And there may be a similar touch of modesty — again perhaps not wholly genuine — in suggestions about love-making,<sup>69</sup> as in *Cas.* 457: licetne amplecti te? and *Rud.* 425: non licet te tangere?, also two passages noted a little earlier, *Mil.* 1329: obsecro licet complecti and *Men.* 368: ire licet accubitus. Another passage already noted, *Cur.* 401: licetne inforare, si incomitari non licet?, sounds like a parody on these, though, because of the *double entente*, it also suggests the legal formula (likewise applied in *malam partem*) in *Cur.* 621: licet te antestari?

These passages are perhaps purposely made as brief as possible, especially the last one, which suggests legal formalism.<sup>70</sup> With this we may compare *Mil.* 71: orant, ambiunt, exobsecrant videre ut liceat, ad sese arcessi iubent, ut tuo non liceat dare operam negotio, in which I have already discussed the first *liceat* (after the verbs of asking) but now am concerned mainly with the second, which has nothing to suggest the agent with *dare*. Here the parasite is pre-

<sup>67</sup> Even the word for speaking is omitted in *Mil.* 501 and *HT* 973, in both of which the slave says simply, *licetne?*, in the latter passage receiving from his master the answer *loquere*. (Cf. also the son's appeal, *licetne pauca?*, and the father's response, *quid dices mihi?*, in *An.* 893.) These examples are quite different from *Mil.* 521 (already cited in note 43), where the reference is to the preceding *vise*.

<sup>68</sup> Contrast the use of *mi* or *mihi* in *Am.* 393: nunc licet mi libere quidvis loqui (already cited in note 63) and *Rud.* 1117: enumquam hodie licebit mihi loqui?, uttered when in a defiant mood by a slave and by the same fisherman, respectively. But the *miles gloriosus* uses *mi* though he is in an abject state of panic, in *Mil.* 1404: non licet mi dicere?; we must conclude either that he retains a touch of his habitual arrogance even under such circumstances, or that the distinction I have suggested does not always operate.

<sup>69</sup> However, the agent is not always omitted (cf. note 68). In contrast with *Cas.* 457 and *Mil.* 1329, note *Per.* 774: te licet me amplecti (with the accusative), and *Am.* 465: patri ut liceret tuto illam amplexari (with the dative); and in contrast with *Rud.* 425, note *Rud.* 245: mihi te licet tangere (with the dative). But it should be observed that these are statements and not, as are the others, questions or requests, where there is more occasion for at least a semblance of humility.

<sup>70</sup> Cf. Horace, *Serm.* 1.9.76: licet antestari? — where there is not even an object for the infinitive.

tending to give a business-like report on the abject adoration aroused in two girls by the charms of the irresistible *miles gloriosus*; as the latter hypocritically feigns distress and ennui (68: *nimiast miseria nimi' pulchrum esse hominem*), the sycophant too pretends to being annoyed, and, as if to get the tiresome story over with as quickly as possible, leaves out all the pronouns.<sup>71</sup> In *Ps.* 254: *licetne, obsecro, bitere an non licet?*, the speaker is genuinely impatient to the degree of exasperation. In *Aul.* 407: *date viam qua fugere liceat*, the omission of the pronoun may give the air of breathless haste, despite the conventional long-winded oration, perhaps a burlesque of the tragic manner, in which the supposed fugitive finds time to indulge.

In two passages the omission of the pronoun definitely produces ambiguity which is unquestionably intentional. One is *Cap.* 411: *nam tua opera et comitate et virtute et sapientia fecisti ut redire liceat ad parentes denuo*; Hegio undoubtedly supplies *mihi* with *redire* and *meos* with *parentes*, thinking that the speaker refers to his eventually being ransomed as a result of the slave's faithfully performing his mission; but really Tyndarus means, and wants Philocrates to know that he means, that he is rewarding his master's former kindnesses by giving him a chance to escape, so that *tibi* must be supplied with *redire* and *tuos* with *parentes*.<sup>72</sup> The second is *Mil.* 1039, where the mischievous *ancilla* gets a rise out of the *miles* by her request, *tecum aetatem exigere ut liceat*. When he, supplying *mihi* or *me* in her unfinished plea, takes her down for her presumption in aspiring to his favors by haughtily interrupting, *nimum optas*, she hastens with pretended humility to identify the aspirant for the warrior's favors by adding, *non me dico, sed eram meam quae te demoritur*.<sup>73</sup>

<sup>71</sup> The passage would read in full: *orant, ambiunt, exobsecrant te videre ut sibi liceat, te ad sese accessi iubent, ut tuo mihi non liceat dare operam negotio*. The absence of the pronoun with the earlier *licet* has already been commented on as facilitated by the presence of the verbs of asking; but there is no doubt that there is a generally hurried air throughout the whole passage (note the asyndeton with the three main verbs).

<sup>72</sup> English is helpless in the face of such a *jeu de mots*. German by substituting the definite article for the possessive adjective can also get effects that English cannot: we may recall in Goethe's *Iphigenie auf Tauris* Apollo's use in addressing Orestes of *die Schwester*, which Orestes interprets to mean *meine Schwester* (Artemis), but which really means *deine Schwester* (Iphigenia). See *Iphigenie auf Tauris* 611, 2113-7.

<sup>73</sup> I suppose *me* and *eram* are the objects of *dico*, though perhaps they might be taken as subjects of the earlier *exigere*, with *dico* parenthetical. Cf. note 46.

In four passages the force of the infinitive is general, with no special individual performing the action, and that may be the reason why no agent is specified. These are *Aul.* 565: *exta inspicere licet*, *Rud.* 621: *lege potius liceat quam vi victo vivere*, *Trin.* 33: *licet iam metere messem*, 1173: *ulcisci non licet*.

To these it might be possible to add three more passages which, however, I have preferred to class above as having a specific agent implied in the context. These are: (1) *Aul.* 379–81:

deinde egomet mecum cogitare intervias  
occepi: festo die si quid prodegeris,  
profesto egere liceat, nisi peperceris.

Here even if Euclio is generalizing, the two second-singular verbs *prodegeris* and *peperceris* certainly imply a generalizing *te* or *tibi* with *egere*; besides I am inclined to think that he is talking directly to himself (note *egomet mecum* in the preceding clause). (2) *Bac.* 337–9:

istuc sapienter saltem fecit filius,  
quom diviti homini id aurum servandum dedit;  
ab eo licebit quamvis subito sumere.

The *licet* clause here has been translated in a general sense: Naudet and, following him, Clonard, "On pourra reprendre l'or quand on voudra"; Nixon, "You can get it from such a man at a moment's notice." But the French version omits, and the English version mistranslates, *ab eo*, which, like *id* in the preceding line, is certainly specific. Thus the meaning seems to me surely to be: "My son acted wisely in this, inasmuch as he gave *this money* to a rich man to keep; *he* will be able to get it back *from him* at no matter how short notice." (3) *Cas.* 957:

nugas istic dicere licet?

Here Naudet and Clonard translate, "Plaisanteries que tout cela, dira-t-on." But Lysidamus is not talking to the world in general; he is using the time-honored and never-failing comic device of addressing the audience<sup>74</sup> (as seems to be made clear by *istic*, "over

<sup>74</sup> Cf. *Cis.* 678–81 and *Aul.* 715–20, the latter a particularly effective example brilliantly imitated by Molière in *l'Avare*.



there you may call this nonsense"), to whom he had doubtless also directed his earlier utterance, 951-2:

sed equis est qui homo munus velit fungier  
pro me?

This use of *istic* I have already compared above with that of *hic* in the formulaic *dicere hic quidvis licet*<sup>75</sup> and the very similar *hic nunc licet dicere; nos sumus*,<sup>76</sup> in which passages the *hic* clearly denotes the talking as being done by the person or persons concerned.

The above four, or, at most, seven, examples are of special interest to my present study because they are the *only* ones in Plautus out of a total of 99<sup>77</sup> where the infinitive with *licet* is to be taken in a general or universal sense, such as we must assume to be the case with *ire*, *scire*, and *videre* if these really did constitute the first portion of *ilicet*, *scilicet*, and *videlicet*. Of such generalities as Lucretius' and Varro's repeated *scire licet*<sup>78</sup> or *videre licet*<sup>79</sup> addressed to the reader or the hearer,<sup>80</sup> and through him to mankind in general, I find not a trace; on the contrary, in at least one instance of a generalization of precisely this sort, Plautus actually inserts a dative to denote the agent: *Am.* 594: *hoc quoivis mirari licet*.<sup>81</sup> This of course does not prove, but it does seem to suggest, that the usage in Lucretius and Varro is a later one probably due in part at least to a misconception of the genesis of the compounds *scilicet* and *videlicet*, which may actually have had a quite different origin.

<sup>75</sup> *Cas.* 794, *Per.* 711, *Poen.* 437, *Truc.* 884.

<sup>76</sup> *Cas.* 196-7.

<sup>77</sup> It may be noted here by way of résumé that in the other 95 the agent is denoted as follows: in 9 by an accusative, in 1 perhaps by a dative reinforced by an accusative (this example is more probably to be classed with the following group), and in 35 (or 36 if we add the foregoing) by a dative; it is easily supplied by the context in 39 (or 36 if we increase the number of passages classed as generalizations from 4 to 7); and in 9 of the remaining cases it is still reasonably clear though for one reason or another (modesty or brevity) it is not designated, while in 2 it is purposely left ambiguous.

<sup>78</sup> Cf. above, note 39.

<sup>79</sup> Cf. above, note 38.

<sup>80</sup> It might be said that in drama we have no opportunity for an address to a reader. But the person addressed whoever he is can occupy the same position; it should be noted in this connection that Lucretius part of the time at least keeps up the fiction of addressing his words directly to Memmius, and that Varro's *RR*, from which all my examples from this author are drawn, is cast in dialogue form throughout.

<sup>81</sup> There is a sort of generalization also in *Aul.* 751: *si ebrio atque amanti inpune facere quod lubeat licet*, where *ebrio atque amanti* stands for drunkards and lovers as a class. But of course this is different.

On the other hand there is definite evidence in Plautus of an affiliation of *licet* with the imperative. Some one gives an order; some one else — usually a subordinate such as a slave or a parasite<sup>82</sup> — answers *licet* "very well, all right, OK." The usage may have had its origin in a question and answer dialogue in which both members contained *licet*, and then *licet* came to be used in the answer alone in a quasi-elliptical fashion. We have four instances of the *licet*? — *licet* sort in Plautus:<sup>83</sup> *Cas.* 457: *licetne amplecti te?* — *licet*; *Mil.* 1329: *obsecro licet complecti?* — *licet*;<sup>84</sup> *Rud.* 1216 and 1222: *omnian licet?* — *licet*.<sup>85</sup> But the perhaps secondary type is far commoner. We may note the following 16 clear-cut cases: *Aul.* 328: *tace.* — *licet*; *Cas.* 421: *abi et fac accures.* — *licet*; 492: *tene marsuppium, abi atque opsona, propera.* — *licet*;<sup>86</sup> 588: *propera.* — *licet*; *Cur.* 727: *age, recipe.* — *licet*; *Men.* 158: *concede.* — *licet*; 169: *olfacta.* — *licet*;<sup>87</sup> 213: *iube.* — *licet*;<sup>88</sup> 224: *cura.* — *licet*; *Mil.* 536: *abi; vide.* — *licet*; *Mos.* 930: *iube.* — *licet*; 1152: *tace, sine me loqui, ausculta.* — *licet*; *Ps.* 357: *adsiste atque onera hunc maledictis.* — *licet*; *Rud.* 1403: *concede.* — *licet*; *Trin.* 517: *concede.* — *licet*; *Truc.* 331: *nuntia me adesse.* — *licet*. Differing only slightly are *Ps.* 652: *dato sumbolum.* — *licet*, with a "future" in-

<sup>82</sup> *Licet* is used in this way by inferior persons in general: a *servus* seven times, *coquus* twice, *parasitus* twice, *leno* once, *meretrix* once, *ancilla* once. Also it is used once by a *miles*, twice by a *senex*, once by a timid *adulescens* whom a slave is directing, twice by a *matrona* to her husband. In the dialogue from the *Rudens* quoted just below, the repeated *licet*'s of the *senex* echo the earlier ones of the *servus*.

<sup>83</sup> Cf. two instances with a negative answer, *non licet*: *Cur.* 621 and *Rud.* 803; also one in which the mood changes, *Rud.* 723-4: *mihi non liceat ancillas abducere?* — *non licet*.

<sup>84</sup> Lodge classes this with the "absolute" use of the infinitive in answers, like the passages that I cite below (e.g. *Aul.* 328); but that is surely an error.

<sup>85</sup> Here there is a sort of play-on-words, *licet* being used both to repeat the question *licet* and also in the sense of "yes, OK" that it has elsewhere in the passage.

<sup>86</sup> Cf. note 91.

<sup>87</sup> The full speech on the patron's part is: *olfacta igitur hinc, Penicule. lepide ut fastidis!* And for the parasite's reply most editions print *decet*, applying to *ut fastidis*, instead of *licet*, answering *olfacta*. But I think we may rather envisage the scene as follows: at Menaechmus' first order, 166: *agedum odorare*, Peniculus draws back, occasioning Menaechmus' indignant question, *abstines?* After hearing Peniculus' answer, Menaechmus offers him a different part of the garment to smell, saying *olfacta igitur hinc, Penicule. Lepide ut fastidis!* may be a reference to Peniculus' earlier behavior; or it may be that we have an additional bit of stage-business, with Peniculus sniffing in a very gingerly fashion, until, spurred on by Menaechmus' reproach, *lepide ut fastidis!*, he resigns himself to his task with an "oh, very well," and takes a good smell. In either case, I believe the reading may well be *licet* "all right," in compliance with the order *olfacta*.

<sup>88</sup> Cf. note 91.

stead of a "present" imperative;<sup>89</sup> *Cur.* 95: tace, occultemus lumen et vocem. — licet, where the imperative is followed by a coordinated hortatory subjunctive;<sup>90</sup> and *Mos.* 402, where Tranio's original order, *cave*, answered by Philolaches' *curabitur*, is followed by the reinforcing *tamquam* clause and then by Philolaches' *licet*.<sup>91</sup> Most striking is the fairly extended passage, *Rud.* 1211–26, which provides us with eight more examples of *licet* in answer to an imperative:

*eloquere* ut haec res optigit de filia;  
 eum *roga* ut relinquat alias res et huc veniat. — licet. —  
*dicito* daturum meam illi filiam uxorem. — licet. —  
 et patrem eius me novisse et mihi esse cognatum. — licet. —  
 sed *propera*. — licet. — iam hic *fac* sit, cena ut curetur. — licet. —  
 omnian licet? — licet. sed scin quid est quod te volo?  
 quod promisisti ut memineris, hodie ut liber sim. — licet. —  
*fac* ut exores Plesidippum ut me manu emittat. — licet. —  
 et tua filia *facito* oret; facile exorabit. — licet. —  
 atque ut mi Ampelisca nubat, ubi ego sim liber. — licet. —  
 atque ut gratum mi beneficium factis experiar. — licet. —  
 omnian licet? — licet; tibi rusum refero gratiam.  
 sed *propera* ire in urbem actutum et *recipe* te huc rusum. — licet.  
 iam hic ero. tu interibi *adorna* ceterum quod opust. — licet.  
 Hercules istum infelicet cum sua licentia!  
 ita meas replevit auris quidquid memorabam "licet."

Here in the space of sixteen lines we find fourteen answers consisting of *licet* "OK, yes," six in the ordinary way after a "present" imperative,<sup>92</sup> two after a "future" imperative<sup>93</sup> (*dicito* or *facito*), one after

<sup>89</sup> Cf. the examples with *dicito* and *facito* in *Rud.* 1213 and 1219, cited just below.

<sup>90</sup> Elsewhere too we find *licet* following a subjunctive that is practically equivalent to an imperative: *Cap.* 949: quaeso ut iubeas. — licet. *Trin.* 372: volo edoceas. — licet. *Am.* 544: numquid vis? — ut advenias. — licet. *Rud.* 1216–21: scin quid est quod volo? ut memineris. — licet. — atque ut nubat. — licet. — atque ut experiar. — licet. *Bac.* 35: quid si potis est ut tu taceas, ego loquar? — licet. *Trin.* 1188: numquid caussaest quin uxorem ducam? — licet. In the *Rudens* excerpt the second and third *ut* clauses are probably parallel to the first, though two speeches with imperatives intervene, *fac ut exores* and *facito oret*, and they might be parallel with the *ut* clause following *fac* (see the whole passage below). In the final *Trin.* quotation, the reading is not certain. — Finally, we may note one more example of *licet* after *vis* and a subjunctive, *Mos.* 322–3: visne ego te ac tu me amplectare? — si tibi cordi est facere, licet, if we assume that *licet* answers "all right" to the question *visne?*, and does not refer to *facere*, as was suggested in note 43 (for still another interpretation, involving different punctuation, see note 61).

<sup>91</sup> We may compare the reinforcing adverbs *sed lepide* in *Cas.* 492, and *atque actutum* in *Men.* 213.

<sup>92</sup> Following *eloquere* and *roga* (1211–12), *propera* (1215), *fac* (1215), *fac* (1218), *propera* and *recipe* (1223), *adorna* (1224).

<sup>93</sup> Cf. note 89.

a continuation of the infinitive clause depending on an imperative (*dicito*), three after *ut* subjunctives that are practically equivalent to imperatives,<sup>94</sup> and two in a quasi-repetition of the verb in the question *omnian licet?*<sup>95</sup>

### III

It seems to me exceedingly likely that our three compounds may have developed in precisely this way from a combination of order and approval, combined in a single speech instead of being divided in dialogue: "go (or know or see) — you may (do so), it's all right (to do so)" — just like Lucretius' *concede necessest* (3.962) "yield — you must (do so), it's necessary (to do so)."

We have some information apart from use in literature about the traditional (and therefore presumably early) use of one at least of our three words: *illicet* was a formula of dismissal<sup>96</sup> at the close of a court trial, and also of farewell to the dead. The first use is testified to by Donatus on *Phor.* 208: *semper illicet finem rei significat, ut actum est. . . . sic iudices de consilio [= concilio?] dimittebantur, suprema dicta cum praeco pronuntiasset "illicet," quod significat ire licet; also by Servius (Daniel) on Aen. 2.424: sane apud veteres illicet significabat sine dubio actum est. origo autem significationis inde descendit: olim iudex ubi sententiam dixerat, si dare finem agendis rebus volebat, per praeconem dicebat "illicet," hoc est ire licet, id est acta et finita res est.*<sup>97</sup> (If I am right in assuming that *i* is an imperative, the fact that the singular was used invariably, even when more than one person was addressed, need cause us no concern: the stem-form of the verb which came to be specialized as a second person singular of the "present" imperative doubtless had wider application at first,<sup>98</sup> and we have plenty of examples of its employment to address more than one person.<sup>99</sup>) The second use is testified to by Servius on *Aen.* 6.216: *quamdiu consumpto cadavere et collectis cineribus diceretur novissimum verbum "illicet"; also on 6.231: novissima verba — id est "illicet": nam "vale" dicebatur post tumuli quoque peracta solemnia. Ver-*

<sup>94</sup> See note 90.

<sup>95</sup> Cf. note 85.

<sup>96</sup> For the application though not the syntax, we may compare our own *nunc dimittis*.

<sup>97</sup> Cf. the more general statement in Donatus on *Eun.* 54: *illicet semper in fine rei transactae ponitur.*

<sup>98</sup> See Brugmann, *Grund.* 2.3.821, 823; Hahn, *TAPhA* 78.327, 328.

<sup>99</sup> E.g. *Men.* 994, *Mil.* 928, *Poen.* 117.

gil's phrase *novissima verba* might have applied to the thrice-repeated *vale*,<sup>100</sup> but does Servius' explicit statement that it referred to *ilicet* mean that he thought of *ilicet* as two words (surely, then, *i* and *licet*) despite his explanation of it elsewhere<sup>101</sup> as "signifying" *ire licet*? It seems natural to think that the dead person was addressed directly with an imperative, precisely as in the likewise formulaic use of *salve* and *vale*, also referred to by Servius on 5.80 (Daniel): *salve, salve, resalve ter*; on 2.644-5: *dici mortuis solet, vale, vale, vale*; on 1.219 (Daniel): *post nomen enim defuncti vocatum tertio dicebatur vale, vale, vale*; and on 11.97: Varro . . . dicit . . . *mortuis salve et vale dici*. For examples in literature, cf. Catullus 101.10:

in perpetuum, frater, ave atque vale;

Vergil, *Aen.* 5.80:

salve, sancte parens,

and 11.97-8:

salve aeternum mihi, maxime Palla,  
aeternumque vale;

and Statius, *Sil.* 3.3.208-9:

salve supremum, senior mitissime patrum,  
supremumque vale.

When a comic character cries out "*ilicet*," it is doubtless with the general tone of our "it's all over but the shouting"; yet the use after *i* of *licet* may correspond to its common employment in answer to an imperative, especially since as a rule the force of the second person which I believe to have been originally implicit in the word seems to remain quite marked. The speaker — almost always a slave or a parasite — usually ejaculates "*ilicet*" in the course of a soliloquy; perhaps it is not wholly fanciful to suggest that he may address the *i* to himself, and then by following it up with the *licet* which we have seen so often used by underlings in response to an imperative, may be engaging in a sort of dialogue with himself suitable to his uncertainty and misery. At all events, there are usually in proximity to the *ilicet* other words in the second person

<sup>100</sup> Referred to by Servius on *Aen.* 2.644-5, quoted just below.

<sup>101</sup> On *Aen.* 6.216. See note 2.

singular to imply that the speaker is talking to himself in a way which suits the interpretation *i licet* more than the non-Plautine generalizing *ire licet*. Except *Ep.* 685<sup>102</sup> — which, incidentally, is said by a *senex*, not a *servus* — I find the force just indicated in all the Plautine instances of the adverbial or interjectional *ilicet*, even the comparatively mild instance *Cur.* 186 (which I compared above with *Ep.* 685 as meaning "it's no use" rather than "it's all over with me"). The slave here tells himself, "you might as well give up"; it is true that he follows this by a first person verb *video*, but in the following line he has the second person *viden'*,<sup>103</sup> surely addressed to himself. In *Am.* 338 the muddled and befuddled slave *Sosia* does not use another second person, to be sure; but he follows up his first persons *timeo*, *torpeo*, *sim*, *scio*, *me*, *possum* with a third person *Sosia*, and would be quite capable of introducing a second person as well. In *St.* 394 the parasite adds a first person *meo*; but just a few lines later he definitely talks to himself, saying, *Gelasime, provenisti*, which he follows up directly with more first persons, *ibo* and *discam*. In *Cis.* 685 in the immediate neighborhood of *ilicet* the desperate *ancilla* uses first persons, *perii* and *me infelicem et scelestam*; but at the end of her speech she reverts, after more first persons, not only to the second person but even to the imperative mood (693-4):

Halisca, hoc age, ad terram aspice et despice,  
oculis investiges, astute augura.

As for the examples of *ilicet* as a verb with the two parts retaining their full meaning, *Cap.* 90, if it really is an example of *ilicet* and not of *licet*,<sup>104</sup> can stand equally well for *ire licet* (the words actually present in the MSS) or for *i licet*, especially if with the Oxford text we keep the MS reading of 89: *potes*,<sup>105</sup> which gives us a second person to go with *i*, the passage 88-90 then running:

et hic quidem hercle, nisi qui colaphos perpeti  
potes parasitus frangique aulas in caput,  
vel extra portam Trigeminam ad saccum ilicet.

<sup>102</sup> I am not even sure whether *ilicet* here is addressed to the slave Epidicus (in which case it *may* have its literal meaning of "go away") or to the other old man, to whom the next words are certainly directed.

<sup>103</sup> On the equivalence of *vide* and *viden'*, see Hofmann, *SS* 566.

<sup>104</sup> Cf. above, notes 13 and 58.

<sup>105</sup> Changed to *potis* by Camerarius and to *potest* by Leo.

*Cap.* 469: *ilicet* parasiticae arti maxumam malam crucem, as has already been said, certainly points toward the interpretation of *ilicet* as *ire licet*; but on the other hand to counterbalance this *Mos.* 848-9:

ergo intro eo igitur sine perductore. — *ilicet*.<sup>106</sup> —  
ibo intro igitur. — mane sis videam

points just as definitely toward the interpretation *i licet*, with Sino's imperative *ilicet* ("go — you may") answering Theopropides' *intro eo* precisely as Tranio's imperative *mane sis* ("stop — if you please") answers his *ibo intro*.<sup>107</sup>

I must confess that the remaining example of *ilicet* in Plautus,<sup>108</sup> *Truc.* 592, which, as I have said, has been compared with both *Cap.* 469 and *Mos.* 848,<sup>109</sup> has me completely baffled. The whole passage (*Truc.* 589-92) runs as follows:

dic ob haec dona quae ad me miserit  
me illum amare plurimum omnium hominum merito,  
meumque honorem illum habere omnium maxumum,  
atque ut huc veniat obsecra. — *ilicet*.

Here *ilicet* does not make sense, either as *i licet* or as *ire licet*. Why should a slave who has just been bidden to convey a message to his master say that some one "may go"? That would come more suitably from Phronesium, who has entrusted the message to him. Is it possible that *ilicet* really belongs to her speech? In that case it would seem exactly like the *Mos.* passage just cited; *ilicet* would stand for *i, licet*—*i* being coordinate with Phronesium's earlier imperative *dic* and perhaps a second one *obsecra*.<sup>110</sup> Or could Phronesium say *i* alone, with Cyamus answering with the familiar *licet* "all right"? Otherwise there seems to be nothing for it but to assume that *ilicet* itself is used in the sense of *licet*, for which I

<sup>106</sup> Lodge actually prints for this *i, licet*.

<sup>107</sup> We shall also find examples in Terence of an imperative coordinated with *ilicet*. In neither author, however, is an *infinitive* ever coordinated with the first element of *ilicet*.

<sup>108</sup> As already said (note 3), I am ignoring the corrupt line *Truc.* 896, in which *ilicet* has been read by some.

<sup>109</sup> Cf. above, notes 29 and 15 respectively.

<sup>110</sup> If we accept Camerarius' reading, the second person imperative *obsecra* (the infinitive *obsecrare*, parallel to *amare* and *habere*, is also possible).

know no parallel,<sup>111</sup> or in that of *ilico*,<sup>112</sup> for which I know no parallel as early as Plautus.<sup>113</sup>

Aside from the troublesome passage just dealt with, Plautus' use of *ilicet* is completely paralleled and reinforced by Terence's. In one case, *Ad.* 790-2 — a *senex* speaking —

em tibi;  
rescivit omnem rem; id nunc clamat; ilicet;  
paratae lites: succurrendumst,

*ilicet* is fairly mild, but still implies that the end has come;<sup>114</sup> it is undoubtedly an aside in which the speaker addresses himself, and is accompanied as so often by another second person form, *em tibi* in the preceding line. *Ilicet* is actually coordinated with finite second person forms in three cases; and in two of the three, the coordinate form, significantly, is an imperative.<sup>115</sup> These are *Eun.* 54-5: actumst, ilicet, peristi; *Eun.* 347-8: ipsast; ilicet; desine; iam conclamatumst; and *HT* 974-5: ilicet; ne te admisce. The first two are the usual cry of despair from a slave. In the third, spoken by a *senex*, *ilicet* has its full verbal force, "be off with you."<sup>116</sup> So, too, in *Phor.* 208-9:

hoc nil est, Phaedria; ilicet.  
quid hic conterimus operam frustra? quin abeo? — et quidem ego?,

where it is a slave who says *ilicet*, I think he is using the word in its full force: "This is no good, Phaedria; you might as well go. Why are we wasting our pains to no effect here? Why don't I go (too)?" If Geta himself, the clever slave, is abandoning the enterprise, surely Phaedria might as well do so also; and so, though he evidently did

<sup>111</sup> But there are two perhaps similar examples with *scilicet*, *Poen.* 600 and *Trin.* 579, discussed below. Is it possible that the confusion of *ilicet* and *scilicet* revealed centuries later perhaps in Sidonius Apollinaris and certainly in Paulus (cf. note 31) also occurs in Plautus?

<sup>112</sup> It is so translated by Naudet ("à l'instant") and by Nixon ("at once").

<sup>113</sup> According to Ernout, the confusion began with Vergil (cf. above, notes 27 and 28); and even if we accept as an example the very dubious passage in Afranius (on which see note 29), we are still about a century later than Plautus.

<sup>114</sup> Ashmore in his edition of Terence suggests as a translation the correspondingly light "the fat is in the fire"; Sargeant in the Loeb Library Terence renders "ring down the curtain!"

<sup>115</sup> Cf. Plautus, *Cis.* 684-5, for the coordination of *ilicet* with finite verbs; and, above all, *Mos.* 848-9, for its coordination with an imperative. See note 107.

<sup>116</sup> Again cf. *Mos.* 848-9.



not take quite seriously Geta's *ilicet* (which he may have assumed was said mainly for its effect on the timorous Antipho), he certainly is not going to remain if Geta goes, and accordingly he chimes in with Geta's "Why don't I go?," saying, "Yes, and I too?" Here, then, Geta's first plural *conterimus*, "we" = "you and I," followed by a first person singular verb dealing with himself alone, justifies us as much as another second person singular verb would have done in interpreting *ilicet* as definitely involving a second person singular verb; in other words *ilicet* and *abeo* represent separately the actions of the two individuals whose conduct is summed up jointly in *conterimus*.

In *scilicet* and *videlicet*, which became, and remained, more thoroughly "adverbialized," so to speak, than *ilicet*, the force of the first element, whether as imperative or as infinitive, seems more completely lost than in *ilicet*. Whether or not we decide that *ilicet* in *Truc.* 592 is used precisely like the simple *licet* as "all right" after an imperative,<sup>117</sup> this certainly seems to be the sense of *scilicet* in *Poen.* 600:

sed ita *adsimulatote* quasi ego sim peregrinus. — *scilicet*,  
and *Trin.* 579:

et *gratulator* meae sorori. — *scilicet*.<sup>118</sup>

But at least we can say this much: it seems hardly likely that in *Cap.* 283:

id Orcum scire oportet *scilicet*,

Plautus would have written *scilicet* directly after *scire oportet* if he had had any feeling of its being equivalent to *scire licet*, though an equation of it with *sci licet* would seem less out of the question. On the other side it might be argued that in *Mos.* 980:

patris amicu's *videlicet*,

an equation of *videlicet* with *videre licet* is possible, but not with *vide licet*, since the speaker (who is *not* soliloquizing) is the one that

<sup>117</sup> Cf. above, note 111.

<sup>118</sup> So, too, in Terence, *Eun.* 185, if we assume a pause after *scilicet*; but an argument against this is the very similar *HT* 358, where a pause after *scilicet* is impossible.

does the perceiving. However, this is more than counterbalanced by *As.* 598–9:

audin' hunc opera ut largus est nocturna? nunc enim esse  
negotiosum interdus videlicet Solonem,

where the preceding second singular *audin'* makes an excellent parallel for an imperative *vide*;<sup>119</sup> and in *St.* 555:

videlicet parcum fuisse illum senem

and 557:

videlicet non fuisse illum aequom adulescentem

*videlicet* "just see"<sup>120</sup> seems to be used with much the tone of *vide* in *Per.* 788:

hoc vide, quae haec fabulast?,

*Bac.* 137–8:

illuc sis vide,  
non paedagogum iam me, sed Lydum vocat,

or *Ps.* 152:

hoc sis vide, ut alias res agunt!<sup>121</sup>

Terence's use of *scilicet* and *videlicet* is not illuminating for our problem. Of the three passages in which *scilicet* is a verb governing indirect discourse, one, *HT* 358–9:

sed istunc exora ut suam esse adsimulet. — scilicet  
facturum me esse,

points toward an imperatival use of *sci* (as does also *Phor.* 792:

quid haec videntur? — scilicet,

<sup>119</sup> On *audin'* as a parallel for *vide*, cf. what was said above (note 103) of *viden'*.

<sup>120</sup> Nixon in his translation brings out the sense well by rendering "the idea of that old fellow being so close-fisted . . . I," "the idea of that young fellow being so unfair . . . I!"

<sup>121</sup> There is an interesting parallel in a Hittite passage, *KUB* 13.4.2.27–8: *nu-za UKÛ-an-na a-ú ZI-aš-lák-kán ku-iš zu-u-wa-an IGI.ÛI.A-wa-az pa-ra-a pit-te-nu-zi*, translated by Sturtevant (*Chr.* 153) "Just look at the man who takes thy choice meat from before thine eyes!"

if my interpretation of *scilicet* as "you may know, you can guess"<sup>122</sup> is correct); and the other two, *HT* 856-7:

is est profecto: id amicae dabitur. — *scilicet*  
datum iri,

and *HT* 891-2:

nam ubi desponsam nuntiasti filio,  
continuo iniecisse verba tibi Dromonem *scilicet*,

point against it (as does also *Ad.* 811-2:

et me tum uxorem credidisti *scilicet*  
ducturum),

since in these passages the person addressed already knows the matter involved and does not need to be told to know it. But I believe the words by Terence's time have lost any exact traces of the original force which may still have lingered on in the days of Plautus.

#### IV

We have now on the basis of a survey of the usage of Plautus, reinforced when relevant by an examination of Terence and others, come to the following conclusions: (1) The force of the component parts of *ilicet*, *scilicet*, and *videlicet* is still very clear to Plautus, and on the whole Terence also reveals awareness of it at least in some degree;<sup>123</sup> this suggests that the date of formation of the compounds was relatively late — probably too late for the phonetic development that must be posited if the first element is an infinitive. (2) A study of Plautus' use of the infinitive with *licet* shows that out of the entire collection of 99 examples there are only 4 which correspond stylistically with the generalizing force of the expression that would have been represented by the locutions *ire licet*, *scire licet*, and *videre licet*; in all the other instances we have a particular individual agent, almost always either (a) represented by a case-form (occasionally the accusative, much oftener the dative) or else (b) clearly supplied from the context through the aid of neighboring words.<sup>124</sup> (3) Plautus in dialogue very frequently combines an imperative with *licet*; a similar combination may have underlain

<sup>122</sup> Cf. note 20.

<sup>123</sup> Later, however, the retention of the original verbal force of the words is met only in archaizers; and at least one of these, Lucretius, reveals that he does not really understand it.

<sup>124</sup> A summary with figures is given above in note 77.

the original formation of our compounds. (4) In the case of that one of the three, *ilicet*, which best retained its original meaning as a verb, an imperatival origin is perhaps suggested by a tendency in both Plautus and Terence to use it (a) in passages, whether monologues or dialogues, in which second person singular forms are employed, and (b) particularly as a parallel to an imperative (never, however, in any comparable relation to an infinitive).

The question may be raised why just the three verb forms *i*, *sci*, and *vide*, and no others, became stereotyped in combination with *licet*. This of course is a question of a type to which it is impossible to give a categorical reply; yet I would venture the conjecture that the use of *i* and *vide* in this particular periphrasis may have been facilitated by the extremely common employment of these two special imperatives in other stereotyped locutions. At times they form paratactic combinations with other verbs, as *Aul.* 829: *i redde aurum*, 458: *i cenam coque* (also read *i et cenam coque*), *St.* 698: *vide, cape provinciam*, *Poen.* 578: *vide sis calleas*, *Ps.* 942: *vide ne titubes*,<sup>125</sup> which may have facilitated their combination with *licet*. At times they practically lose all verbal force, becoming mere interjections,<sup>126</sup> as *abi* in *As.* 704 and *vide* in *An.* 588, which may have facilitated the loss of verbal force that turned *ilicet* and, to an even greater extent, *videlicet* — and, correspondingly, *scilicet* — into adverbs. I should think *scilicet* would hardly have developed independently, because of the extreme rarity of the form *sci*,<sup>127</sup> but probably its similarity in sound to *ilicet*, and in sense to *videlicet*,<sup>128</sup> helped to produce and preserve it.<sup>129</sup>

The loss of verbal force was doubtless also facilitated by the fact that the second element *licet* was invariable. Because of this, its origin as a finite verb could easily be lost sight of, just as must have happened in the formation of the pronominal nominatives

<sup>125</sup> *Vide*, like *fac* and *cave*, when followed by the subjunctive (with or without *ut* or *ne*), became practically an auxiliary verb providing a periphrastic substitute for the simple imperative. In these instances *vide* developed into the main verb, whereas in *videlicet* this rôle fell not to it but to *licet*; however, in the original paratactic form this distinction of course did not exist.

<sup>126</sup> See Hofmann, *Umgang.* 37, 38; Sommer, *Hdb.* 2 516.

<sup>127</sup> Plautus perhaps uses it once, in *Mil.* 282 (where some editors read *scias*); he uses *scito* five times (*As.* 641, 858, *Cap.* 438, *Cur.* 53, *Mos.* 72).

<sup>128</sup> We may recall the occasional confusion of *scilicet* both with *ilicet* and with *videlicet*, commented on above (see notes 23 and 111).

<sup>129</sup> Thus I differ with Ernout, who believes that *scilicet*, formed on the basis of *ilicet*, in its turn gave rise to *videlicet* (*Mél. Thomas* 232).

*quivis* and *quilibet*.<sup>130</sup> No such stereotyping could have taken place in the *calefacio* type, which kept the complete conjugation of *facio*; there only the imperatival element *cale* became "frozen," unquestionably as a result of a series of extensions which we need not posit for the *-licet* type.<sup>131</sup>

## V

In conclusion, I should like to revert to the possible relationship between the formation studied here and the one exemplified by *calefacio*, already referred to at the opening of the present paper. In the article there cited<sup>132</sup> I included among my arguments for seeing an imperative in the first element of *calefacio*, the possible parallelism of the group consisting of *ilicet*, *scilicet*, and *videlicet*; and it would be circular reasoning to include among my present arguments for seeing an imperative in the first element of this group, the parallelism of the *calefacio* type. Yet it cannot be denied that the formations *calefacio* and *videlicet* do bear a striking resemblance to each other,<sup>133</sup> suggesting a common origin;<sup>134</sup> and in my opinion *no* common origin is possible for the two other than the one here

<sup>130</sup> Kent (75) traces them to the special instances *quem vis* and *cui libet*, but in assuming the latter he seems to me to go astray; the "pleasing" is to apply not to the person designated by the relative, but to the person who does the choosing. Actually, the starting-point could have been any oblique case (and perhaps even the nominative is conceivable, as *\*veniat quivis*, *\*veniat quilibet*, i.e. *veniat qui veniat vis*, *veniat qui veniat libet*, though both locutions seem to me highly unlikely); cf. the examples cited by Leumann (SS 196) and Hofmann (ib. 488), *Bac.* 866: *pacisce quid tibi lubet*, *Bac.* 871: *pacisce quid vis*, *Cur.* 38: *ama quid lubet*, *HT* 464: *pacisce quid lubet*.

<sup>131</sup> So far as I know, *licet*, like *libet* in the pronominal forms just referred to, is strictly limited to the present indicative. This seems to me a forcible argument against Studemund's surely unwarranted correction *ilicebit* in *Ps.* 1182 (already referred to above, note 42).

<sup>132</sup> 324 note 116.

<sup>133</sup> We may note as one resemblance that the first element is usually, though not invariably, subject to iambic shortening: note *madēfactatis* in *Ps.* 184, but *obstupēfecit* in *Phor.* 284 (on which see Skutsch 103-4 and cf. *ib.* 210); *vidēlicet* in *Cap.* 286, *Mil.* 1283, *Mos.* 980, *St.* 555 and 557, but *vidēlicet* in *As.* 599 (cf. Müller 279-80). On the other hand the forms in *-bam* and *-bo*, which are usually grouped with the *-facio* and *-licet* types, never have iambic shortening, suggesting that they crystallized at a quite different period.

<sup>134</sup> Most scholars who have discussed them do assume a common origin for them, as also for the forms in *-bam* and *-bo* (which I think are surely to be kept apart from them; cf. above, notes 18 and 133). Skutsch, of course, whose explanation for *calefacio* (that it comes from a participle) cannot possibly apply to *videlicet*, is bound to separate them; see below, notes 139 and 142. Kent, who accepts an explanation for *calefacio* (that it comes from an infinitive) which he might have applied to *videlicet*, none the less does not do so; see *The Forms of Lat.* 130, and cf. above, note 2.

proposed. Let us examine rapidly in the light of this desideratum the four different explanations that have been offered for the first element in one or both of our two types of formation, *calefacio* and *videlicet*. The element has been pronounced: (1) A verbal stem.<sup>135</sup> This applies equally well to both, but can be accepted for neither, since a stem is an abstraction without real existence, and thus cannot enter into a periphrasis.<sup>136</sup> (2) An infinitive, either an old lost form<sup>137</sup> in *\*-e*,<sup>138</sup> or the normal form in *-re* < *\*-si*.<sup>139</sup> This is the view usually accepted concerning *videlicet*,<sup>140</sup> but on semantic grounds it seems most unlikely for *calefacio*.<sup>141</sup> (3) A participle.<sup>142</sup> This, despite possible phonetic difficulties,<sup>143</sup> is the view more widely accepted than others concerning *calefacio*,<sup>144</sup> but of course is utterly out of the question in regard to *videlicet*. (4) An imperative. This is the view that was formerly widely held concerning *videlicet*,<sup>145</sup> and still is held by at least one authority.<sup>146</sup> So far as I know, it was never suggested in regard to *calefacio* before the appearance last year of the article in which I attempted to prove it. If I was right there, perhaps I am right here as well.

<sup>135</sup> E.g. by Lindsay 490, who gives this explanation alike for forms in *-bam* and *-bo*, in *-facio*, and in *licet*.

<sup>136</sup> Cf. Schmidt, *KZ* 26.396-7; Stowasser, *ZOG* 52.193; Hoffmann, *RhM* 73.223; Hahn, *TAPhA* 78.316-7.

<sup>137</sup> The existence of such a form has never really been proved. Cf. Skutsch 284; Sommer, *Krit. Erl.* 140-1.

<sup>138</sup> Stolz, *Hist. Gram.* 1.436, and SS<sup>1</sup> 255, suggests this for *calefacio*; Skutsch 104 admits the possibility for *videlicet*, though he has a quite different explanation for *calefacio*.

<sup>139</sup> The final syllable, whatever it was, would ultimately have been lost as a result of the successive processes of syncope, assimilation, and shortening of a long consonant after a long vowel. Hoffmann, *RhM* 73.230-1, traces *calefacio* to *\*calese + facio* (cf. Kent 130), and *videlicet* to either *\*videse* or *videre + licet*. Skutsch, 104 and note 4, 284 note 1, traces *videlicet* to *videre + licet*, though he has not completely ruled out the alternative explanation of the first element as an infinitival element *vide* (see above, note 138).

<sup>140</sup> For references see above, note 2.

<sup>141</sup> Cf. Skutsch 284; Hahn 318 and notes 74 and 75.

<sup>142</sup> Stowasser, *ZOG* 52.193-5; Skutsch 214-6, 283-92.

<sup>143</sup> On these see Sonnenburg, *IF* 12.386; Güntert, *SHAW* 8.8.19; Hoffmann, *RhM* 73.231.

<sup>144</sup> E.g. by Sommer, *Krit. Erl.* 144, and Brugmann, *Grund.* 2.3.506, though both have some reservations. For objections see Hahn 319-20.

<sup>145</sup> This explanation was on the whole the generally accepted one till Skutsch published his view that the element in question is an infinitive (see 104, 284 note 1). Cf. note 2 above.

<sup>146</sup> Kent 130; cf. notes 2 and 134 above.